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ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate 
the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes to-
wards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal 
identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “per-
sonal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the 
term “personal identity” refers to the numerical identity of persons and its analysis pro-
vides the persistence conditions for persons. I argue that if the subjective theories pur-
port to provide a criterion of numerical personal identity, they fail. A different interpre-
tation may suggest that they purport to provide a non-numerical type of identity for the 
purpose of providing plausible analyses of certain identity-related practical concerns.  
I argue that the criteria the subjective theories provide fail to capture several of the 
identity-related concerns. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected as well.  
KEYWORDS: Compensation – identification – numerical identity – personal identity – 
responsibility – self-constitution – self-interested concern.  
1. Introduction 
 In the current theory of personal identity, two strikingly different ap-
proaches can be distinguished in the attempts to define the notion of per-
sonal identity. On the one hand, there are theories according to which the 
relation of personal identity holds between persons if and only if there are 
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some other relations, such as biological or psychological continuity, which 
connect the persons. The definition of the identity relation takes the fol-
lowing form:  
 (OI) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a person at t and something y exists 
at t*, x=y if and only if x at t and y at t* stand in relation R, 
where R is the relation preferred by the particular theory.  
 Such a definition of personal identity provides a criterion of numerical 
identity of persons, because it states on what conditions a person identified 
at one time is the same entity as a person identified at another time, as well 
as implies answers to the questions of when persons begin to exist, what 
changes they can persist, and when they cease to exist.  
 However, there are some theories that use the concept of personal iden-
tity differently. These theories include M. Schechtman’s, K. Korsgaard’s, 
and C. Rovane’s theories, and, for reasons to be specified shortly, I will call 
these theories subjective (as opposed to objective theories, outlined above). 
The idea is that personal identity is not a relation that holds in the lives of 
persons independently of their beliefs and attitudes. Rather, persons deter-
mine what their identity is and constitute themselves, and they achieve this 
by adopting a certain attitude to certain actions or mental states such as ex-
periences, beliefs, intentions. As a result of this attitude, these mental 
states and actions begin to characterize the given person, or, in other words, 
by adopting this attitude the person makes them her own, or, in still other 
words, they become part of her identity. Each of the theories I discuss pro-
vides a unique analysis of this identity-constituting attitude. However, be-
fore I introduce the particular analyses, I will refer to the attitude as the at-
titude of identification.  
 We can now express the general idea behind subjective theories more 
formally as follows: 
 (SI) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a person at t and there is a set of 
mental states and actions M at t*, M will be part of x’s identity at 
t if and only if x at t identifies with M.  
According to the proponents of subjective theories, they offer much more 
plausible grounding for certain practical concerns that have traditionally 
been taken to presuppose personal identity. It is widely believed, for in-
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stance, that the notions of responsibility, compensation and self-interested con-
cern presuppose personal identity. Proponents of subjective theories claim 
that it is their theories, as opposed to the objective ones, that best explain 
these concerns.  
 Most importantly, some statements of the proponents of subjective 
theories even seem to suggest that their criteria have implications for the 
persistence of persons, that is, for the numerical identity of persons. If the 
claims are taken seriously, subjective theories are further committed to the 
following thesis: 
 (SIP) Necessarily, for any person x at t and any set M of mental states 
and actions at t*, if M is part of x’s identity, then for any y at t*, 
y is the subject of the mental states and actions M if and only if 
x=y.  
 This principle states that if a set of (possibly past or future) mental 
states and actions is part of a person’s identity (in the sense defined by the 
individual theories), then whoever is (was, will be) the subject of those 
mental states and actions must be numerically identical to the person and 
vice versa. This statement seems like a truism, because it is hard to imagine 
a situation in which some characteristics were mine without their bearer 
being me. But it is, actually, an open question whether subjective theories 
are committed to it. This question along with the question if a person can 
make an action or a mental state part of her identity merely by identifying 
with them in the way that the discussed theories propose, will be the sub-
ject of this paper.  
 I will first explain what it means to say that personal identity is a sub-
jective relation. Next, I will provide examples of subjective theories with 
detailed descriptions of their claims concerning the concept of personal 
identity. We will see that their proponents sometimes speak as if they were 
addressing the issue of numerical personal identity, because they seem to 
suggest that their proposed criteria have implications for the existence and 
persistence of persons. I will argue, however, that defining numerical iden-
tity by means of the criteria proposed by the theories leads to problems and 
paradoxes. I will then suggest that subjective theories might be addressing a 
different concept of personal identity: one which does not have implications 
for our persistence and is not committed to (SIP). I will call this notion 
practical identity and provide textual evidence to support this interpretation. 
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However, I will also argue that while this interpretation avoids some of the 
problems of the first interpretation, it faces new problems: the concept of 
practical identity covers a range of characteristics that cannot all be ac-
counted for by means of identification. Thus, we should reject the convic-
tion that the subjective theories provide an analysis of personal identity of 
any sort, even if they may be useful in analysing aspects of some particular 
practical concerns. 
2. Subjective theories of personal identity 
 Before presenting the details of subjective theories it is necessary to de-
fine what I mean by the term subjective.  
 (S)  The relation of personal identity is subjective iff its exemplifica-
tion constitutively depends on an attitude that the person has 
towards certain actions or mental states, such as beliefs, desires, 
experiences.1
 I will begin my illustration of subjective theories with Marya Schecht-
man’s narrative self-constitution view (see Schechtman 1996). Schecht-
man’s motivation is to develop a theory of personal identity that captures 
our intuitions about the identity-related practical concerns listed above. 
Schechtman provides a characterization criterion of identity, which specifies 
under what conditions a mental state or an action characterizes, or is at-
tributable to, a person. She develops a narrative self-constitution theory of 
characterization. This theory is based on the idea that persons are self-
creating beings and that persons’ lives have a narrative form. Persons con-
stitute themselves by coming to think of themselves as persisting subjects 
who have had experiences in the past and will continue to have experiences 
  
In the following sections we will look in a greater detail at the mechanism 
of identity constitution that the individual theories describe, including the 
particular forms of identification they propose as identity-constituting.  
2.1. Narrative identity 
                                                     
1  This is an adapted version of Huemer’s definiton of a subjective property. See Hu-
emer (2005, 2). 
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in the future, taking certain experiences as theirs by incorporating them 
into a self-told story of their lives (cf. Schechtman 1996, 94). An experi-
ence or an action characterizes a person as long as and to the degree that it 
is incorporated in a story that the person creates about her life.  
 This theory is committed to principle (SI), which takes the following 
form:  
 (SIN) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a person at t and there is a set of 
mental states and actions M at t*, M will be part of x’s identity at 
t if and only if x at t incorporates M into the narrative of her life.  
According to this criterion, personal identity consists in the existence of  
a coherent story of a person’s life, and that fact further presupposes that the 
person adopts a certain attitude towards certain experiences and actions, in 
which she incorporates them into her narrative and, thus, makes them her 
own. This makes it a subjective theory according to my criterion. 
 This conclusion can be supported by several of Schechtman’s claims: 
According to Schechtman, personal identity is a product of a person’s ac-
tion: 
I develop a view according to which a person creates his identity by 
forming an autobiographical narrative – a story of his life. (Schechtman 
1996, 93) 
That action has the form of attitude adoption: 
An identity in the sense of the characterization question, is not, I claim, 
something that an individual has whether she knows it or not, but 
something that she has because she acknowledges her personhood and 
appropriates certain actions and experiences as her own. (Schechtman 
1996, 95) 
Personhood and personal identity thus rely crucially on an individual’s 
inner life and her attitude toward her actions and experiences. (Schech-
tman 1996, 95) 
 So, personal identity is a subjective relation in Schechtman’s theory. But 
what exactly does Schechtman mean by personal identity? In particular, does 
the concept have implications for the persistence of persons? Textual evi-
dence suggests that it at least purports to do so. Schechtman demonstrates 
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this goal with an illustration of someone who has long been the victim of  
a violent, abusive spouse, which results in deep personality changes – the 
person becomes timid and fearful, supresses her own desires and character-
istics, severs crucial relationships, and may have trouble identifying with 
the teenager she sees in a high school photo. Schechtman argues that it 
would be appropriate to say that the person has “lost her identity”, that she 
“is no longer the same person”, and that “the person we knew is gone” (cf. 
Schechtman 1996, 88). She adds that these claims need not be considered 
entirely metaphorical (cf. Schechtman 1996, 88), and finally concludes that 
“the degree to which a person is alive, and hence survives, seems linked to 
the degree to which her actions, experiences, and characteristics are her 
own …” (Schechtman 1996, 89).  
 The idea seems to be that if a person does not incorporate her past ac-
tions and mental states into her current narrative, those actions and mental 
states are not her own, that is, they are not part of her identity (according 
to (SI)), and, therefore, she cannot be numerically identical to the person 
who had the experiences and carried out the actions (according to (SIP)).  
 When I have presented further examples of subjective theories, we will 
see whether this idea is coherent.  
2.2. The unity of agency 
 In an influential paper (see Korsgaard 1989), Christine Korsgaard devel-
ops a theory to challenge Derek Parfit’s theory of personal identity and its 
implications for our identity-related practical concerns.2
                                                     
2  It would be beyond the scope of this paper to map the whole dispute. For an expo-
sition of the main differences and objections see Shoemaker (1996) and Bělohrad 
(2014). 
 A central notion in 
Korsgaard’s agential theory of personal identity is the notion of authorial 
connection. She states that the difference between actions and choices on 
the one hand and mere behaviour determined by biological and psychologi-
cal laws on the other is the fact that the former require agents and choos-
ers, i.e. they have a subject. The relationship of agents to actions and 
choices is essentially authorial. Unlike mere happenings, our actions and 
choices are essentially our own (cf. Korsgaard 1989, 121). Authorial connec-
tions stratify the class of our mental states into levels of differing impor-
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tance. According to Korsgaard, the mental states that we have an authorial 
connection to are much more relevant for personal identity: 
This is because beliefs and desires you have actively arrived at are more 
truly your own than those which have simply arisen in you… (Korsgaard 
1989, 121)3
 Korsgaard discusses the implications of her view for several practical 
concerns, including self-interested concern and compensation. But again, 
 
 Korsgaard illustrates the role of authorial connections in personal iden-
tity through a popular thought experiment involving a mad surgeon who 
drastically manipulates a person’s memory and character. On a standard 
psychological theory, the severe discontinuity in the person’s psychology 
causes the person’s demise and her replacement by another person. Kors-
gaard, however, maintains that it is not the discontinuity itself that causes 
the demise of the person. Rather, it is the fact that the intervention is ex-
ternal and unauthorized by the person. In other words, even severe changes 
in psychology are consistent with personal identity, as long as those 
changes are the product of the person’s own choice. Korsgaard concludes 
that “the sort of continuity needed for what matters to me in my own per-
sonal identity essentially involves my agency” (Korsgaard 1989, 123). 
 Korsgaard’s theory has all the elements characteristic of a subjective 
theory of personal identity. The relevant identity-constituting attitude is 
authorial connection. Personal identity is a product of agency, and agency 
consists in authorizing mental states and actions. Only the mental states 
and actions that are authorized in this manner become characteristic of who 
the person is, that is, part of her identity. Criterion (SI) takes the following 
form in Korsgaard’s theory:  
 (SIA) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a person at t and there is a set of 
mental states and actions M at t*, M will be part of x’s identity at 
t if and only if x at t authorizes the metal states and actions in 
M.  
                                                     
3  The subtle shift of focus from actions and choices to beliefs and desires in this pa-
ragraph is not my mistake in interpreting Korsgaard. I believe that it can be explained 
by the fact that Korsgaard states that one can view certain mental states as forms of ac-
tion. See Korsgaard (1989, 103). 
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our question is whether the criterion purports to define numerical identity. 
It seems that if authorial connectedness is the identity-constituting atti-
tude, it marks our boundaries and is a condition for our persistence. The 
mad surgeon case supports this claim, for it shows that Korsgaard believes 
that if person does not authorize anticipated experiences, those experiences 
are not her own. This means, according to (SI), that they are not part of 
her identity, and, according to (SIP), she cannot be numerically identical to 
the subject of the experiences. In contrast, a person can survive even drastic 
psychological changes as long as these are the product of the person’s deci-
sions, that is, authorized (cf. Korsgaard 1989, 123).  
2.3. Identity as a choice 
 My final example of a subjective theory of personal identity is a theory 
developed by Carol Rovane (see Rovane 2009). 
 The central claim that Rovane defends is that the existence of a person 
is never a metaphysical or a biological given but is always bound up with 
the exercise of effort and will (cf. Rovane 2009, 96). To argue for the 
claim, Rovane first explains what she means by the concept of person.  
 Persons, according to Rovane, are subjects with the capacity for rational 
agency – they are able to deliberate about the reasons for action and to pre-
sent reasons to others and thus influence their decisions. Further, the abil-
ity to respond to reasons constrains persons’ behaviour in accordance with 
the normative requirements of rationality. These require of persons that they 
arrive at an act on the basis of an all-things-considered judgment about 
what it would be best to do in the light of all their beliefs, desires and atti-
tudes. This requires that persons resolve contradictions among their be-
liefs, work out their implications, and rank their preferences in transitive 
order. In sum, persons must strive to achieve what Rovane calls an overall 
rational unity within themselves (cf. Rovane 2009, 105).  
 According to Rovane, the normative requirement to achieve overall ra-
tional unity makes an implicit reference to personal identity, because it de-
fines what it is for an individual person to be fully or ideally rational. After 
all, we do not consider it a failure of rationality if several people have in-
compatible preferences; we only do so if one does (cf. Rovane 2009, 105). 
Thus, one can approach the issue of personal identity by considering under 
what conditions a commitment to meeting the normative requirements of 
rationality arises, because “[t]his is the condition in which we have a person 
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in the sense that goes together with the ethical criterion of personhood” 
(Rovane 2009, 105).  
 Unfortunately, Rovane does not explicitly state her criterion of person-
hood, so we must rely on an interpretation of her claims. Rovane says that 
the existence of a person is bound up with the exercise of effort and will. 
The effort and will seem to be related to the person’s activity of unifying 
her mental states into a coherent and consistent set. Thus, Rovane is 
committed to the following thesis: 
 (EP) Necessarily, for any x, x is a person if and only if x seeks an over-
all rational unity within the set of her mental states.  
Rovane’s criterion of personhood has interesting implications. Rovane 
claims that the commitment to achieving rational unity can also transcend 
the boundaries of a single human being. 
[Human beings] can exercise their rational capacities together so as to 
achieve rational unity within groups that are larger than a single human 
being, and they can exercise their rational capacities in more restricted 
ways so as to achieve rational unity within parts that are smaller than  
a single human being. (Rovane 2009, 106) 
In other words, there may be group persons, comprising several human be-
ings, and multiple persons within a single human being.  
 The concept of multiple persons is illustrated by an imaginary situation in 
which we visit a friend at a company headquarters and see that our friend has 
“become” a bureaucrat who cannot recognize the demands of friendship (cf. 
Rovane 2009, 112). According to Rovane, his life seems to take up less than 
the whole human being and the rest of it literally belongs to the life of the 
corporation. Importantly, Rovane states that “this may not be mere ‘role 
playing’. This may be, literally, a fragmentation of the human being into 
relatively independent spheres of rational activity, with separate rational 
points of view that can be separately engaged” (Rovane 2009, 112). Rovane 
elaborates that we typically try to live our lives in rationally unified ways for 
the sake of more specific projects, such as relationships and careers. She 
stresses, however, that these are just projects and that they are optional. 
It is possible for human beings to strive for much less rational unity 
than these projects require and still be striving for rational unity. And, 
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sometimes, the result may be relatively independent spheres of rational 
unity with a significant degree of segregation. (Rovane 2009, 112) 
 I believe that Rovane’s arguments for the claim that personal identity is 
a matter of choice, rather than a metaphysical or biological given, prove 
that her theory is another instance of a subjective theory of personal iden-
tity. If, according to Rovane, personal identity consists in the commitment 
to achieving overall rational unity, it presupposes adopting an attitude to-
wards a set of mental states, leading to their adoption or rejection. I believe 
that criterion (SI) takes the following form in Rovane’s theory:  
 (SIC) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a person at t and there is a set of 
mental states and actions M at t*, M will be part of x’s identity at 
t if and only if x at t seeks to bring the mental states and actions 
in M into rational unity with her other mental states and actions 
existing at t.  
This is, then, how Rovane uses the concept of personal identity. And 
again, what we want to consider is whether this concept purports to be the 
concept of numerical identity, implying the persistence conditions of per-
sons. Rovane’s theory is less explicit about this, but her comment about the 
friend-bureaucrat example, according to which it may literally involve  
a fragmentation of the human being into separate rational points of view 
that can be separately engaged, at least seems to be addressing numerical 
identity. That is, some of Rovane’s claims seem to commit her to the view 
that if a person at t does not seek a rational unity among the set of mental 
states she has at t and a set of states existing at t*, she cannot be numeri-
cally identical to whoever is subject of the mental states at t*.  
 I thus conclude my presentation of three subjective theories of identity. 
In what follows I will assess the plausibility of their claims. For brevity,  
I will often use the term (an attitude of) identification to refer to the mecha-
nism of identity-constitution the theories employ.  
3. Interpreting “identity” 
 We have seen that there is textual evidence that supports the belief that 
the subjective theories purport to define numerical personal identity. How-
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ever, the belief that numerical personal identity could be defined by means 
of a subjective attitude to a set of mental states or actions leads to grave 
difficulties.  
3.1. The presupposition of numerical identity 
 The first problem is that the theories presuppose that persons can be de-
fined independently of the criteria that the theories propose. To see that, 
consider again the general form of the subjective criterion (SI). Obvious 
counterexamples show that, as such, this statement cannot be true, because  
a person is limited in the range of mental states and actions that she can 
plausibly identify with. For example, consider the desire to have a third child, 
the belief that whales are fish, or the action of executing Saddam Hussein, 
which may all have occurred at some places on December 30, 2006. Any the-
ory that claims that if I identify with these mental states and actions, they are 
mine must be seriously mistaken. I never had that desire or belief, and I did 
not carry out that action, so their incorporation in my narrative, my authori-
zation of them, or my effort to rationally unify them with my current beliefs 
and actions would not show that they are mine, but rather that I am seriously 
confused. This shows that I can only reasonably identify with a subset of all 
the mental states and actions that there are. These are presumably those that 
I have objectively had and carried out. But in that case there must be another 
criterion of personal identity that will establish which mental states and ac-
tions are objectively mine, and only then can I legitimately adopt an evalua-
tive attitude and identify with them. But this further shows that identifica-
tion cannot make these mental states and actions literally mine and, con-
versely, if I fail to identify them, they do not really cease to be mine. 
 This point can be elaborated with respect to the concept of existence. 
As I have stated, a criterion of numerical identity will imply an answer to 
the question of when persons begin to exist. If the subjective theories de-
fine numerical identity, they are committed to the claim that persons only 
begin to exist as a result of their identification with their mental states and 
actions. But if persons do not exist prior to the act of identification, they 
cannot have any mental states, let alone identify with them. Conversely, 
persons already have to exist and have mental states in order to be able to 
identify with them.  
 In a later work, Korsgaard takes up this “paradox of self-constitution” 
and argues that it is not a paradox at all (see Korsgaard 2009). Cases of self-
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constitution are common in the natural world and there is no mystery 
about them. A giraffe’s nutritive processes turn food into matter that re-
places tissue that is in need of renewal. Thus, a giraffe constitutes itself by 
its own activity. “Being a giraffe is doing something: a giraffe is, quite es-
sentially, an entity that is always making herself into a giraffe” (Korsgaard 
2009, 36). Similarly, persons can constitute themselves by their own activ-
ity.  
 But it is questionable whether this analogy dissolves the mystery. The 
case shows that living systems can maintain themselves once they are alive. 
It does not show that they can bring themselves into existence by their own 
activity. A giraffe does feed itself, but a giraffe embryo does not start its 
own existence through its activity. But if the theories purport to address 
numerical identity, they must explain how persons begin to exist, not just 
how they maintain their existence. And it is clear that persons cannot be-
gin to exist by identifying with their mental states and actions. 
3.2. A paradox of identification 
 Another argument against the claim that personal identity is the result 
of a person’s identification with certain mental states and actions is that it 
leads to a paradox. We have seen that if subjective theories purport to ad-
dress numerical identity, they are committed to (SI) as well as (SIP). Taken 
together, these principles say:  
 (SISIP) A person x at t is identical to someone y at t* if and only if x at 
t identifies with the mental states and actions of the y at t*.  
The problem is that identification is not a symmetrical relation. As a re-
sult, the person at t may identify with the anticipated mental states and ac-
tions of a person at a t*, but the person at t* may fail to identify with the 
mental states and actions of the person at t. This supposition generates  
a paradox: the person at t is identical with the person at t*, while the per-
son at t* is not identical with the person at t.4
                                                     
4  If subjective theories purport to define numerical identity, they also share a host of 
problems with psychological theories of personal identity, such as the fetus problem and 
the thinking animal problem. See Olson (2008). 
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3.3. The wrong interpretation? 
 The above arguments show that even though some claims by the au-
thors reveal their intention to define numerical personal identity, this pro-
ject cannot succeed. But perhaps my interpretation is mistaken. Perhaps 
when Rovane says that a human being can literally be fragmented into dif-
ferent persons, she does not mean literally. Perhaps when Schechtman 
states that our claims that a person who has been the victim of abuse is “no 
longer the same person” or “is gone” “need not be considered entirely 
metaphorical” (Schechtman 1996, 88), she is not implying they are to be 
taken literally. Taken at face value, these claims are about numerical iden-
tity. But, in any case, the authors also make claims that seem to contradict 
the above claims. Rovane, for instance, writes: 
… we needn’t infer that personal identity is distinct from human identi-
ty, in the sense that there is a distinct thing – the person – whose life is 
shorter than a given human being’s life. We can suppose instead that 
personhood is a status that is sometimes achieved by a given human be-
ing and sometimes not, without introducing any distinct existence. 
(Rovane 2009, 101) 
In a later work, Schechtman, describing several cases in which a person 
changes so much that she can no longer identify with her past mental 
states, comments: 
… we might say that she has become a different person, but there is 
some sense in which we clearly do not mean it. The change is only re-
markable because she also remains the same person. (Schechtman 2001, 
98) 
 As a result of these confusing remarks, it is quite unclear whether or 
not numerical identity is the focus of these theories. But since the numeri-
cal interpretation leads to obvious difficulties, we should try to find a more 
plausible interpretation.  
 What could be a more plausible interpretation? I believe we can propose 
an interpretation according to which the theories attempt to define what 
could be called practical identity. All of the authors point out that the con-
cept of identity they develop is deeply related to our practical lives. 
Schechtman proposes the notion in her attempt to analyse, besides survival, 
the concepts of responsibility, self-concern, and compensation. Both Kors-
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gaard and Rovane maintain that the concept is closely tied to the notion of 
agency, which is crucial in our conception of ourselves as moral beings 
(e.g., Korsgaard 1989, 132). I believe that we could find an interpretation 
that emphasises the practical dimension of persons while it does not entail 
any claims about persons’ existence and persistence. 
 In this interpretation the basic entities are human beings, whose exis-
tence and persistence is determined by a criterion of numerical identity. (It 
does not matter now which criterion it is). The concept of personhood re-
fers to a status or a role that a human being may or may not assume. When 
a human being assumes this role, no new entity begins to exist; the human 
being merely becomes a person, that is, acquires an important cluster of 
properties which make it an appropriate target of our practical concerns. 
And this happens, according to the subjective theories, when the human 
being identifies with its mental states.  
 This interpretation deals with the paradox of self-constitution discussed 
above. Persons do not bring themselves into being, but are brought into be-
ing when human beings identify with their mental states. The act of iden-
tification in which persons begin to exist does not presuppose the existence 
of persons. It only presupposes the existence of human beings that have 
mental states and capacities to identify with them.  
 Further, on this interpretation, the concept of personal identity refers 
to the unity of this role. That is, it refers to a relation which has to hold in 
the life of a human being in order for the human being to be the same per-
son in time. If the human being is the same person in time, we may legiti-
mately attribute responsibility to it for past actions, compensate it for past 
harms, and it may legitimately express self-concern for its future well-
being. And on this interpretation of the subjective theories, one would be 
the same person in time as long as one identified with roughly the same 
mental states and actions.  
 This interpretation enables us to provide benign paraphrases to the 
troubling implications of the numerical interpretation of subjective theo-
ries. For example, saying of someone who does not identify with her past 
mental states that “she is no longer the same person” does not mean that 
an entity has ceased to exist and a new one has arisen. It simply means that 
the human being that she is has begun to exemplify a different set of prac-
tically relevant characteristics. Saying that the past person has “not sur-
vived” simply means that the human being no longer has the set of practi-
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cally relevant characteristics that she used to have, and that, as a result, we 
may not legitimately blame her for her past actions or needn’t compensate 
her for past harms. On this interpretation, using the vocabulary of existence 
and persistence is merely a misleading way of speaking about (continuing) 
property exemplification. It is as misleading as saying of a president of  
a corporation who has become the president of a country that “she is no 
longer the same president” or “the president we knew is gone”.  
 It is worth emphasising how this interpretation differs from the nu-
merical one. The major difference is in that, on the numerical interpreta-
tion, if person P at t is not identical to person Q at t*, there are two enti-
ties. But on the practical interpretation P and Q denote complex properties 
which may be exemplified in time by a single entity, a single human being. 
And saying of a single human being that it is no longer the same person as 
it used to be only means that the practical concerns and attitudes that were 
legitimate with respect to the former one do not carry over to the latter 
one.  
 In what follows I would like to show that even if this interpretation is 
logically and ontologically more innocent, its practical implications are still 
extremely implausible.  
4. Identification and practical identity 
 As I have indicated, the subjective theories are committed to the claim 
that being the same person amounts to identifying with the same set of 
mental states. At the same time, being the same person is a necessary con-
dition for the legitimacy of the identity-related practical concerns. How-
ever, I will attempt to show that identifying with the same set of mental 
states is not a necessary condition for the legitimacy of the concerns. I con-
tend that identification is only relevant for some aspects of some of our iden-
tity-related practical concerns, while others are not affected by it.  
 Let me first argue that identification is not a necessary condition for the 
legitimate application of several practical concerns. Rovane’s example of 
multiple persons in one body is a particularly suitable example to illustrate 
this. As we have seen, Rovane claims there may be separate spheres of ra-
tional unity within one body, resulting in the existence of multiple persons. 
A single human being can be a friend (person 1), while on other occasions 
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she can be a bureaucrat who cannot recognize the demands of friendship 
(person 2). If personal identity in subjective theories is practical identity, we 
are led to the conclusion that a single human being can have multiple prac-
tical identities, that is, multiple roles relevant for the attribution of respon-
sibility, compensation and legitimacy of self-concern.  
 However, this supposition is hard to believe. Suppose that my friend 
makes a promise to me. Are we really ready to accept that once he enters 
the headquarters and becomes a bureaucrat who cannot recognize the de-
mands of friendship, it is not legitimate for me to insist that he keep the 
promise? Or suppose that the bureaucrat embezzles a large sum of money. 
Would the police really be unjustified in arresting my friend? Would we be 
willing to accept the friend’s excuse that he is not responsible for the bu-
reaucrat’s actions because he is not seeking rational unity among his mental 
states and the mental states of the bureaucrat? Or take another example. 
Suppose the bureaucrat is compensated for work-related health problems. 
Would we really consider it a theft if my friend enjoyed the benefits result-
ing from the compensation? I doubt that we are ready to accept these 
claims. And since we are not, it shows that we do not think that the fact 
that a person does not identify with certain mental states or actions means 
that we may not legitimately compensate her or hold her responsible with 
respect to those mental states or actions.  
 But Rovane’s example may be an easy target, because it is very difficult 
to take seriously the idea that one human being could really change her 
practical identities by walking into and out of her office. Also, Rovane’s ex-
ample seems to be special in that it is meant to be an example of a human 
being alternately assuming the role of two persons. The examples offered 
by Schechtman and Korsgaard seem to suggest, rather, the idea that a hu-
man being may forever cease to have the status of one person and, instead, 
assume the status of another. In such cases it may seem more plausible that 
our practical concerns directed at the former person may no longer apply to 
the latter one.  
 Even so, I would like to insist that these cases still fail to illustrate  
a situation in which a human being’s practical identity changes as a result of 
her non-identification with her past mental states. To see this, it will be 
useful to consider a few more examples to stimulate our intuitions.  
 Schechtman gives an example of a carefree young woman who eventu-
ally settles down and becomes a serious matron. Schechtman describes her 
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as someone who can remember her wild days, but who cannot recapture 
the emotions and desires she once had. She is someone who fails to see 
how she could have made the choices she made and who is completely 
alienated from the past reasons that motivated the choices (cf. Schechtman 
2001, 101). In the terminology we have been using, she cannot identify 
with her past mental states.  
 Korsgaard suggests that a person whose mental life has been changed by 
external forces in a way that has not been authorized by that person leads 
to a loss of identity. Her example of a mad surgeon is a far-fetched thought 
experiment, which may not satisfy those who are sceptical about using such 
examples as evidence. But some actual cases come close to this hypothetical 
scenario. A case that comes to mind is the life story of Phineas Gage. Gage 
was a construction worker who suffered a serious brain injury when a metal 
rod was driven through his skull, resulting in profound changes in his pro-
social behaviour. Even though the extent of the mental changes in this case 
is controversial, what is important is that these changes were not self-
induced. Let us suppose, without any pretence of historical accuracy, that  
a complete lack of identification with his past occurred after the accident. 
Let us now consider what our practical attitudes in these cases should be.  
 Take first the notion of responsibility. If the serious matron fails to 
identify with the mental states of the carefree young woman, then, accord-
ing to the subjective theories, we should be inclined to say that she cannot 
be responsible for any acts the young woman carried out. But suppose that 
the carefree woman badly hurt the feelings of a good friend of hers and 
they now meet after many years. It seems quite obvious to me that an apol-
ogy is appropriate and rightly expected and, therefore, that the matron is 
still responsible for the act. But if, as a result of her non-identification with 
the young woman, the matron is a different person, as subjective theories 
say, any expectation of apology is unwarranted. Even if the serious matron 
is the same human being as the carefree woman, they are different for the 
purposes of attribution of responsibility, so there should be no reason for 
the matron to deal with the consequences of the young woman’s reckless 
behaviour. I find this implication of subjective theories hard to accept.  
 But it may be objected that I have ignored the fact that responsibility 
comes in degrees. Some actions can be attributed to an individual in the 
minimal sense that they occur in her history and it is true that an act of 
non-identification cannot erase them. The individual is responsible for 
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them in the sense that the actions are still hers. That fact, however, shows 
very little about the extent to which she should currently be blamed – and 
this aspect of responsibility is determined by the degree of the current per-
son’s identification with the acts. After all, the matron is mentally so dif-
ferent that she may not even understand the reasons that led to the past 
act, let alone identify with that act. She does not deserve the same degree 
of blame as someone who truly identifies with an evil act. 
 This argument has some force. It does seem that at least the degree of 
responsibility interpreted as blameworthiness depends on whether or not 
the blamed subject identifies with the act for which she is blamed. After 
all, we recognize this distinction in our different attitudes towards the 
online murders committed by ISIS as opposed to cases of unintentional 
manslaughter in traffic accidents, for instance. But responsibility is not the 
only practical concern that attaches to personal identity and I would like to 
show that non-identification does not play a role in other such concerns.  
 Take self-concern, for instance, and consider the idea that a lack of 
identification justifies a corresponding lack of self-concern. Suppose I do 
not identify with the person who will be in my body in 30 years’ time, be-
cause I am a bon vivant who lives by the motto of carpe diem. Suppose, fur-
ther, that due to my love of food, alcohol and tobacco I am badly damaging 
the health of that person. It does not seem obviously true to me that the 
fact that I do not identify with the future person who I (as a human being) 
will become makes it justifiable for me to ignore her well-being. But then, 
self-concern is a practical concern that subjective theories fail to fully ac-
count for, because identification is not necessary the appropriateness of 
self-concern.  
 Let us now turn to compensation, which both Korsgaard and Schecht-
man discuss. Schechtman, for instance, focuses on the question of what 
constitutes adequate compensation for past harm (cf. Schechtman 1996, 157), 
and she argues, convincingly, that the answer does depend on the degree to 
which one identifies with the mental states and actions that compensation 
affects. If I take myself to be a football-despising opera lover and someone 
compensates me for a past insult with Premier League tickets, I am not 
likely to consider that adequate. The more closely compensation targets 
mental states I identify with, the more of a compensation it is for me. 
 But there is a more fundamental question relating to compensation. It 
is the question of when compensation is legitimate in the first place. It does 
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not seem identification has any say here. We believe that a person is legiti-
mately compensated for a past harm only if she is the same person as the 
one to whom the harm was done. If personal identity was analysed by 
means of identification, it would follow that a person is only a legitimate 
target of compensation if the person identifies with the mental states of the 
person to whom harm was done. But then, if we are supposing that the 
changes resulting from Gage’s injury could have been so severe as to lead to 
his non-identification with his previous desires, actions, beliefs and deci-
sions, we must conclude that he does not deserve any compensation, be-
cause, while being the same human being, after the accident he was a dif-
ferent person. If the reader finds this conclusion hard to accept, as I do, it 
may be because we actually believe that the legitimacy of compensation 
does not presuppose identification. Thus, there is another aspect of our 
practical identity that cannot be captured by subjective theories.  
5. Conclusion 
 Personal identity is both a metaphysical and a practical concept. It pro-
vides the existence and persistence conditions for human persons, and it is 
presupposed in our attributions of responsibility, compensation, expressions 
of self-concern, and other everyday practical attitudes and concerns. Defin-
ing identity by means of an attitude towards mental states and actions fails 
to provide existence and persistence conditions for human persons. In sev-
eral instances, it also fails to account for our intuitions as to when the iden-
tity-related practical concerns and attitudes are appropriate. Thus, subjec-
tive theories of personal identity fail in both of the interpretations and owe 
us a clear explanation of what concept of personal identity they purport to 
define.5
                                                     
5  I would like to thank the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR) for supporting my re-
search by grant no. 13-00624P. This paper was also supported by the Faculty of Arts, 
Masaryk University. I am also indebted to Tomáš Hříbek and Eric Olson for their 
comments to drafts of this paper.  
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